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MECHANISMS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAUSAL 
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Nicholas A. Holt 
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The aim of the current dissertation was to investigate the mechanisms that 
contribute to the emergence of causal perception in infancy. Previous research suggests 
that the experience of self-produced causal action may be necessary to promote the 
development of causal perception (Rakison & Krogh, 2012).  The goal of the current 
study was two-fold: (1) to further explore the roles of self-produced action, haptic, 
proprioceptive and visual information, and parental interaction on young infants’ 
understanding of causality. To assess the impact of these factors on infants’ causal 
learning, 4½-month-olds were randomly assigned to one four conditions. Three of the 
conditions (Active with Parent Interaction, Active Without Parent Interaction, and 
Passive with Parent Interaction) provided infants with object-manipulation training in 
which infants wore “sticky mittens” that allowed them to manipulate Velcro-covered 
toys. The fourth condition was a no-training control condition. Following training, 
infants’ ability to perceive the difference between causal and non-causal versions of 
simple collision events (one ball colliding with another) was tested. It was hypothesized 
that both of the active training conditions would facilitate infants’ causal perception, 
while passive training would produce no effects relative to the control condition. Results 
demonstrated that 4½-month-old infants who received no training, and same-aged infants 
who received passive training that controlled for perceptual aspects of self-produced 
vii 
causal action experience (haptic, proprioceptive, and visual information), did not show 
evidence of causal perception. As hypothesized, active training experience facilitated 
causal perception in 4½-month-olds. However, surprisingly, active training only 
facilitated learning in the condition in which parents were instructed not to interact with 
their infants. Comparisons of the two active training groups (with and without parent 
interaction) revealed that the groups did not differ on a number of infant characteristics 
and behaviors. The results of this study suggest: (1) self-produced causal actions 
constitute a mechanism by which causal perception arises in infancy, and (2) parental 
interactions during infants’ object explorations may interfere with learning.
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INTRODUCTION & REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Causality is a critical concept that allows us to organize our experiences in useful 
ways and provides the foundation for our understanding of the happenings of the world. 
A causal relationship exists when the occurrence of one event directly produces the 
occurrence of another event. When one billiard ball collides with another stationary ball 
and launches it into motion, people perceive the first ball as causing the second ball to 
move (Michotte, 1963). This ability to perceive a causal relationship between two events 
is fundamental to our experience of the world. It is from this basic ability that 
explanations and interpretations of our experiences are generated and that predictions 
about the future become possible. Constructing and exploiting knowledge of causality is 
an essential survival function that allows living things to tailor their actions to the 
constraints of their environment. 
How do we come to perceive the causes of events that occur in the world? More 
specifically, what are the mechanisms that are responsible for the emergence of causal 
perception? Based on experiments in adults dating back to the 1940s, the visual 
impression of causality produced by watching a simple collision event (one ball colliding 
with another) has traditionally been viewed as a purely perceptual phenomenon that is 
separate from the process of causal inference (Danks, 2000; Leslie, 1986; Leslie & 
Keeble, 1987; Michotte, 1963; Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). 
However, the ability to intervene on the world in a causal manner has also received a 
great deal of attention as a potential mechanism by which causal knowledge is 
constructed and the ability to perceive causal relationships is derived (Muentener & 
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Carey, 2010; Piaget, 1954; Rakison & Krogh, 2012; Sloman, 2005, Tenenbaum & 
Griffiths, 2003; White, 2007, 2009, 2012). The mechanism(s) by which causal perception 
arises are not well understood. Historically, the question of whether causal perception is a 
purely perceptual modular ability or one that derives input from learning that occurs via 
action experience has been a topic of great debate. The current dissertation aims to trace 
the ability to perceive cause-and-effect relationships in visual events to its origin in 
infancy in order to empirically determine whether the ability to causally intervene on 
objects constitutes a mechanism by which causal perception naturally arises. 
Perspectives on the Origin of the Ability to Perceive Causes 
Historically, the prevailing view of causal beliefs in philosophy has been that they 
are learned and that they involve inference (Hume, 1740/1978). For instance, a person 
who turns on a faucet believes that doing so will cause water to flow from the tap.  
According to Hume, until we have observed the effect of turning on a faucet, we can have 
no a priori knowledge about the consequences of the action. Based on this view, our 
ability to interpret a collision event in terms of one object causing the movement of a 
second object requires previous observations of object collisions in order for an 
expectation or prediction to be generated. Contrary to this view, and beginning with the 
seminal empirical work of Albert Michotte (1963), vision scientists have argued that 
causal explanations and beliefs can be generated without prior experience from purely 
perceptual experiences of causality. Based on an expansive set of experiments exploring 
adults’ perceptions of causality, Michotte advanced a strong case for the idea that, under 
certain conditions, causal relationships can be perceived automatically from a single 
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presentation of any novel visual event. It is from Michotte’s foundational studies that 
modern perspectives on the origin of causal perception have developed. 
While causal events may take numerous forms in the natural world, Michotte’s 
(1963) most famous experiments focused on simple collision events. The prototypical 
causal event examined by Michotte (termed Direct Launching) depicted an object (A) 
that advanced from left to right and made contact with a second object (B), which began 
to move immediately after the point of contact. After viewing this event, participants 
consistently reported that they saw the first object cause the movement of the second 
object in the direct launching event. Another type of event (termed Delayed Launching) 
examined by Michotte was identical to the direct launching event except that there was a 
temporal delay between the initial contact and the movement of the second object (B). 
Michotte’s participants did not report that the first object (A) caused the movement of the 
second object after viewing the delayed launching event (B). Similarly, a third type of 
event (termed No Collision or Gap Launching) used by Michotte was identical to the 
direct launching event except that the first object (A) stopped short of making contact 
with the second object (B), but the second object (B)  began to move immediately (see 
Figure 1). After viewing the gap launching event, participants did not report that the first 
object (A) caused the movement of the second object (B). Through these experiments, 
and many others (over 100 in total), Michotte was able to identify important visual cues 
that must be present in order to produce the impression of a causal connection between 
two object movements. Namely, Michotte found that spatial contiguity, where one object 
appears to contact another object, and temporal contiguity, where an object begins to 
move immediately after a perceived collision, were both important factors that affected 
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whether or not a visual impression of causality was reported by adults. This set of 
findings has since had a profound impact on the study of causal perception in both adults 
and infants. 
 
Figure 1. Examples of three types of Michottian launching events. 
 
Based on his large collection of empirical results, Michotte (1963) characterized 
causal perception as an irresistible and automatic perceptual phenomenon, and 
hypothesized that causal perception was an ability largely encapsulated from top-down 
knowledge. This view has been maintained and expanded upon in modern accounts of 
causal perception (Leslie, 1986; Schlottmann, 2000; Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992; Scholl 
& Tremoulet, 2000). However, mounting evidence has demonstrated that top-down 
knowledge about objects influences the impression of causality produced by watching a 
collision (launching) event. Namely, it has been noted that an impression of force seems 
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to accompany the impression of causality produced by a visual launching event (White, 
2007, 2009).  
When we act on objects, we perceive that we apply force (or effort) to cause a 
desired effect. Anecdotally, when we view a bowling ball knock over bowling pins, our 
dominant perception is that the ball exerted force onto the pins, not that the pins failed to 
resist the ball. In this way, White (2009) notes that our interpretation of causal events is 
unidirectional (i.e., we do not perceive that the object receiving the action exerted an 
equal and opposite force at the point of collision). This notion is supported by the fact 
that in not one of Michotte’s (1963) experiments did participants suggest that object B 
stopped the movement of object A. Recent studies have found additional evidence for an 
asymmetrical interpretation of the direction of force in causal events (White, 2006, 2007).  
For example, White (2007) explicitly asked adults to make a judgement about the amount 
of force exerted on object B by object A (and vice versa) while watching a series of 
launching events. Participants consistently demonstrated an asymmetrical bias to rate the 
force imparted by the object (A) that caused the collision as greater than the force 
imparted by the object (B) that received the collision. Interestingly, participants’ 
judgements of the force exerted by object B were consistently near zero even when object 
A appeared to “bounce” backward from the point of collision. White (2009) has proposed 
a theory that this asymmetry, and the perception of causality more generally, is governed 
by the interpretation of events in terms of our previous haptic experiences. In White’s 
view, perceptions of collisions are automatically compared to representations of previous 
experiences that involved physically exerting force on objects. When we interact causally 
with objects, we experience a feeling of our own effort. The feeling involved in this type 
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of action is referred to commonly as a sense of agency. When we watch a collision event, 
White suggests that we generalize our experiences of agency to interpret the force that 
object A imparts onto object B to cause it to move. Thus, for White, the origin of causal 
perception lies in our agentive experiences causally manipulating objects. Highly similar 
hypotheses about the origin of causal impressions have been advanced in slightly 
different forms by several other notable thinkers (James, 1890; Maine de Biran, in 
Michotte, 1963; Piaget, 1954).  
The idea that visual impressions of causality involve inferences about objects that 
are derived from physical experience is in direct competition with the theory advanced by 
Michotte (1963) and other perception scientists that causal perception is largely 
uninfluenced by top-down factors. In addition, Michotte believed that causal perception 
was an innate ability. However, the competing hypothesis presented by White (2009) 
suggests that causal perception involves a learning component. One decisive way to 
determine whether the perceptual account proposed by Michotte or the experience-based 
account proposed by White and others is correct is to examine how infants come to 
perceive the causal relations between objects in collision events.  
Causal Perception in Infancy 
 Traditionally, research on causal perception in infancy has sought to settle the 
debate over whether or not the ability to perceive causation from launching events is 
innate. Building off of Michotte’s ideas, Leslie (1982) sought to test whether infants were 
sensitive to the perceptual differences between various types of launching events. 
However, since Leslie’s first studies of causal perception in infancy, researchers have 
found evidence against Michotte’s claims. The sections that follow systematically 
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demonstrate that causal perception: (1) is probably not innate because it emerges in 
distinct stanges between 4 and 6 months of age (Cohen & Amsel, 1998), and (2) is not 
encapsulated from top-down influences because physical (size) and dispositional (agent 
or patient) features of the objects involved in causal events affect infants’ expectations 
and interpretations of these events (Kotovsky & Baillargeon, 1998; Muentener & Carey, 
2010). Finally, this review will evaluate evidence in favor of the idea that causal 
perception originates from self-produced experiences manipulating objects in infancy. 
Is Causal Perception Innate? 
Early investigations of Infants’ Causal Perception. Alan Leslie was the first to 
conduct systematic investigations of causal perception in infancy. In doing so, he adapted 
Michotte’s (1963) methods to test infants’ sensitivity to different versions of launching 
events. The primary method of investigating causal perception in infancy involves 
habituating (i.e., presenting a stimulus repeatedly until infants begin to lose interest) 
infants to one type of Michottian event (direct, delayed, or gap launching) and then 
measuring the degree to which infants dishabituate or recover interest toward the other 
types of events. If infants recover interest toward an event that contains a conceptual 
difference (i.e., a difference in causal structure), but not toward an event of the same 
conceptual category that is perceptually different, then it is inferred that they are capable 
of differentiating causal from non-causal events.  
Studies using variations of this method have found that the ability to differentiate 
causal from non-causal events emerges early in the second half of the first year of life 
(Cohen & Amsel, 1998; Leslie, 1984). Leslie (1984) conducted a series of experiments 
with 6½-month-olds in order to examine whether infants perceive causality when viewing 
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direct launching events. In Experiment 1A, Leslie habituated infants to either a direct 
launching event that involved two different colored objects or an event in which a single 
object moved from left to right across a screen (see Figure 2). During the test phase, 
infants’ response to the same event played in reverse was measured. Leslie found that 
infants in the direct launching condition recovered interest to the reversed event whereas 
infants in the continuous motion condition did not. In Experiment 1B, infants were 
habituated to either a direct launching event that involved two different colored objects or 
an event in which a single object moved from left to right across a screen and changed 
from one color to another halfway through the continuous movement. Infants’ responses 
to the opposite type of event (direct launching or continuous with color change) were 
measured during the test phase. Infants in both habituation conditions recovered interest 
to the opposite type of event at test, which indicated that 6½-month-olds could tell the 
difference between a direct launching event and a single object that changed color 
halfway through a continuous movement. These findings suggest that infants are able to 
represent two distinct objects and two distinct movements while viewing a direct 
launching event.  
 9 
 
Figure 2. Habituation and test events used in Experiment 1A by Leslie (1984). 
 
Building upon these findings, Leslie (1984) conducted another experiment to 
determine whether 6½-month-old infants are capable of responding on the basis of a 
causal/non-causal distinction to variations of launching events. In this experiment 
(Experiment 2), Leslie habituated infants to either a direct launching (causal) or delayed 
launching (non-causal) event. In the direct launching condition, infants were tested on a 
delayed-gap launching (non-causal) event, which is an event that combines the one-
second pause of the delay event with the spatial gap from the gap event. In the delayed 
launching condition, infants were tested on a gap launching event (non-causal). Infants 
appeared to recover interest toward the test trial in both conditions, but the magnitude of 
the recovery was significantly greater for those infants who were habituated to the causal 
(direct launching) event and then tested on the non-causal (delayed-gap launching) event. 
Leslie interpreted this pattern of results as evidence that 6½-month-olds can perceive and 
encode information about causality. Leslie went on to suggest that causal perception in 
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infancy is the result of an innate perceptual module that operates without experience-
driven learning about causality (Leslie, 1988; 1995). 
In an attempt to further explore the results obtained by Leslie (1984), Oakes and 
Cohen (1990) conducted one of the first studies to examine how causal perception 
develops over the first year of life. Oakes and Cohen (1990) replicated Leslie’s (1984) 
basic experimental design but tested 6- and 10-month-olds.  In addition, Oakes and 
Cohen (1990) opted to use images of realistic toy vehicles as their stimuli in lieu of red 
and green blocks and expanded their investigation to include three different conditions in 
which infants were habituated to either a direct, delayed, or gap launching event. 
Following the habituation procedure, infants were tested on all three of the events. This 
more elaborate design allowed for the researchers to more precisely investigate whether 
infants test responses are driven by perceptual differences between the events, or by an 
understanding of the conceptual differences between causal and non-causal events. 
Results obtained in the 10-month-old group demonstrated that, when habituated to a 
direct launching event, infants showed an increase in looking time toward both the gap 
and delayed launching events. However, 10-month-olds habituated to either type of non-
causal event only showed increased interest toward the direct launching event at test. This 
evidence indicates that 10-month-olds responded solely on the basis of causality, as those 
infants who were habituated to a non-causal event generalized their habituation to a novel 
non-causal event. However, the 6-month-olds tested in the experiment showed no 
evidence of causal perception whatsoever. Oakes and Cohen interpreted this null finding 
with 6-month-olds as evidence that stimulus complexity may overwhelm infants’ ability 
to process the events properly.  
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To further examine how causal perception may develop, Cohen and Amsel (1998) 
used simpler stimuli and tested 4-, 5½-, and 6¼- month-olds on a task replicated from 
Leslie (1984) but with the additional within-subjects test trials employed by Oakes and 
Cohen (1990). Again, in this study, infants were randomly assigned to one of three 
habituation conditions: direct launching, delayed launching, or gap launching. Following 
habitation, each infant viewed all three types of events on separate test trials that were 
counterbalanced to prevent order effects. The results of this study convincingly 
demonstrate a distinct developmental progression. Cohen and Amsel found that although 
the 6 ¼-month-olds replicated Leslie’s (1984) findings and dishabituated on the basis of 
separate causal/non-causal event categories, the 5 ½-month-olds habituated to the non-
causal events dishabituated equally to the opposite non-causal event and the causal event, 
indicating that they responded based on the spatiotemporal differences between the 
events. Furthermore, the 4-month-olds dishabituated solely to the differences in the 
continuous movement between the events. Another study with even younger infants (3½-
month-olds) has confirmed that very young infants respond only to the differences in 
continuous motion between launching events (Desrochers, 1999).  Cohen and Amsel 
suggested that these findings point to the conclusion that infants are able to encode 
information about the temporal differences between launching events early on and then, 
after some development has occurred, they begin to encode information about the 
temporal and spatial differences between the events. They also suggested that later, at 
around 6 to 6½ months of age, infants are able to integrate information about the spatial 
and temporal properties of launching events into a representation that allows a distinction 
to be made between causal and non-causal events.  
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Causal Perception in Newborns? The studies discussed above provide evidence 
against Michotte’s (1963) suggestion that infants are born with an innate predisposition to 
perceive direct launching events as causal. Another way to determine whether causal 
perception is innate in origin, however, is to look for evidence that newborns can reliably 
discriminate between causal and non-causal events. In the only study to examine causal 
perception at birth, Mascalzoni, Regolin, Vallortigara, and Simion (2013) recently 
measured newborns’ visual preference for variations of Michottian events by showing 
them two different types of launching events side-by-side over two counterbalanced 
trials. Results of their first experiment showed that 10 out of 12 newborns looked longer 
toward a launching event than a delay event. Authors claim that the results of this 
experiment “favour the idea that naïve newborns are able to perceive physical causality in 
a launching event.” However, as Cohen & Amsel (1998) made clear, prior to being able 
to discriminate between Michottian events on the basis of causality, infants discriminate 
the events first on the basis of continuous motion. In fact, Cohen and Amsel explicitly 
note that a simple preference for the causal launching event prior to 5½ months of age 
may potentially be explained by “entrainment to continuous movement.”  
In two subsequent experiments Mascalzoni et al. examined newborns’ preference 
for similar events with different manipulations to reject the possibility that participants 
responded preferentially to continuous motion present in their first experiment. 
Experiment 2 presented infants with a direct and delayed launching event side-by-side. 
However, in this experiment the trajectory of the second object in both events was altered 
by 90° (see Figure 3). The results of this experiment showed that 10 out of 12 infants 
looked longer at the delayed launching event. Authors concluded that newborns preferred 
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temporal discontinuity in this case because they do not have an implicit preference for 
continuity of motion. Thus, they claim that this pattern of results “refutes the possibility 
that newborns’ preference for the launching event found in Experiment 1 might have 
been due to a mere preference for temporal continuity.” However, as Michotte (1963) 
demonstrated in adults, altering the trajectory of a direct launching event by as little as 
25° is enough to diminish the impression of causality considerably in adults. Similarly, a 
45° change in trajectory disrupts causal perception in infants younger than 10 months of 
age (Oakes, 1994). Thus, it would seem that if newborns possess an innate disposition to 
attend to events involving physical causality the correct prediction for Experiment 2 
should be that infants would show no preference for either of the events, as both should 
be interpreted as non-causal.   
 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of events used as stimuli in Experiments 1 (A), 2 (B), and 3 (C) 
reported in Mascalzoni et al. (2013). Figure reconstructed from original report.  
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In the third experiment reported by Mascalzoni et al. (2013), newborns viewed a 
direct launching event and an “inverted-sequence” of the same event (see Figure 5). In 
the inverted sequence object B first moved from the center of the screen toward one side, 
followed immediately by the movement of object A from the opposite side toward the 
center. Authors report that 12 out of 16 infants looked longer at the direct launching event 
than the inverted sequence. This result was interpreted as evidence that newborns 
discriminate between events that differ in the order of object displacement. Because 
newborns preferred the causal event this result was also taken as confirmation of the 
findings from Experiment 1. However, as in Experiment 1, this set of contrasting events 
does not control for the possibility that newborns are simply tracking the continuous 
movement of the direct launching event. 
In sum, the set of studies reported by Mascalzoni et al. (2013) falls short of 
demonstrating the existence of an innate ability to represent causal relations. The use of 
preference as a measure is problematic in that it remains unclear how a simple visual 
preference provides a measure of causal perception. Oakes and Cohen (1990), for 
example, showed infants direct, gap, and delayed launching events, and a fourth event 
that depicted the simple continuous movement of one object, and found no significant 
visual preferences for any of the events at 6 or 10 months of age. Additionally, the 
habituation studies reviewed above demonstrate that developmental differences exist in 
infants’ causal perception (i.e., Cohen & Amsel, 1998; Oakes & Cohen, 1990), which 
does not support the authors’ central claim that newborns can perceive a direct launching 
event as causal. Thus, currently, evidence suggests that the ability to perceive causality in 
launching events starts to develop sometime between 4 and 6 months of age. 
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The Case Against Encapsulated Causal Perception in Infancy 
 Evidence presented thus far has suggested that causal perception is probably not 
an innate ability. However, Michotte (1963) and others have also claimed that causal 
perception is encapsulated from top-down influences. At least two studies from the infant 
literature provide clear evidence that, in infancy, causal perception is influenced by top-
down information about the objects involved in visual collision events. First, in a study 
conducted by Kotovsky and Baillargeon (1998), 5½- and 6½-month-olds were habituated 
to a launching event in which a cylinder rolled down a hill and collided with a “bug” 
object, which in turn moved away from the point of collision immediately following the 
impact and came to rest in the middle of the scene. Following habituation, infants were 
tested using versions of the events in which the cylinder was either larger or smaller than 
the one used in the original sequence, and following contact in the test trials the bug 
always moved significantly further (i.e. to the far end of the scene). Although results 
from the younger group are difficult to interpret, it appears that 6½-month-olds 
dishabituated only to the test event in which the smaller object caused an increase in the 
post-collision distance traveled by the bug, indicating that their representation of a 
collision is influenced to some degree by the size of the objects involved. If causal 
perception were encapsulated from top-down influence, it would seem that the output of 
the mechanism should not be affected by physical attributes such as size. Thus, 
Kotovosky & Baillargeon’s (1998) findings corroborate White’s (2009) theory that a 
mental simulation of contact force actually underlies causal perception. 
Another more recent set of five experiments also provides consistent evidence 
that refutes the encapsulated perceptual account of causal perception in infancy. 
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Muentener and Carey (2010) contend that the experience-based account of the origin of 
causal perception theorized by White (2009) and Piaget (1954) generates two important 
predictions that contradict the Michottian account: (1) infants’ earliest understanding of 
causality should be based on perceiving causal objects as intentional agents because the 
concept of causality originates from experiences of causal agency, and (2) infants’ 
earliest causal perception abilities should not be restricted to motion events because when 
acting as causal agents, infants do not simply cause objects to move, they can also cause 
state changes.  
In order to test these predictions, Muentener and Carey (2010) habituated 8-
month-olds to an ambiguous motion event. During the habituation event, a train entered 
the field of view on a stage, and then advanced toward a red box that was partially 
occluded by a black screen in the middle of the stage area. As it advanced, the train 
moved completely behind the screen, and then the red box began to move in the same 
direction toward the right side of the stage (see Figure 4). Importantly, no collision 
between the train and the red box was made visible to infants at any point during 
habituation. During the test phase, infants saw both a direct launching version and a gap 
launching version of the habituation event, but the occluding screen was not present. 
When the key area of the event was unoccluded during the test phase, infants looked 
significantly longer at the gap launching version of the habituation event. This finding 
suggests that by 8 months infants are able to infer a causal collision between two objects 
when the collision itself is occluded and not directly perceived (see also Ball, 1973; 
Kosugi, Ishida, & Fujita, 2003; Muentener & Carey, 2006; Spelke, Phillips and 
Woodward, 1995).  
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Figure 4. Schematic illustration of the habituation event used by Muentener & Carey 
(2010). 
 
In Experiment 2, Muentener and Carey (2010) showed infants two types of causal 
state-change events in order to determine whether infants infer causality from events that 
involve physical state changes, but do not involve visual collisions. In one event a train 
moved from left to right toward a white box partially occluded by a screen. When the 
train became fully occluded by the screen, the box changed color from white to red. The 
second type of event was identical except that the box was red and after the train was 
occluded fully by the screen the box broke apart into pieces. During the test phase, 
infants saw both a direct launching version and a gap launching version of the habituation 
event, but the occluding screen was not present. Infants looking behavior at test was 
identical for both versions of the event across both event types. However, in three nearly 
identical additional experiments, Muentener and Carey showed that when a human hand 
or an agentive object with a face replaces the toy train as the causal agent in the events, 
infants dishabituate to the gap launching version of the event. This finding indicates that 
although infants are not sensitive to the causal connection present in an event where an 
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inanimate object causes a state change, by 8 months, infants infer a causal state change 
when the causal object can be easily identified as an agent. Furthermore, by 12 months, 
infants understand that inanimate objects (such as a toy train or a ball) can only cause 
state changes involving randomness and disorder, while agents (such as hands or objects 
with faces) are able to cause state changes that are orderly (Newman, Keil, Kuhlmeier, & 
Wynn, 2010).  These results suggest that the dispositional features (agent or inanimate 
object) of the objects involved in causal events, as well as the type of causal event 
(collision or state change) interact to produce different causal inferences. These results 
seem to refute Michotte’s idea that causal perception is produced by an encapsulated, 
purely perceptual process. However, the experience-based account advanced by White 
(2009) does not simply predict that causal perception is influenced by top-down 
knowledge. The account proposed by White and others explicitly predicts that causal 
perception involves a mental simulation of the force involved in a collision that is based 
on self-produced agentive object interactions. The last step needed to fully dissolve the 
Michottian perceptual account and sufficiently endorse the experience-based account, 
then, is to demonstrate that the earliest causal inferences about visual events are directly 
facilitated by self-produced causal interactions with objects. 
The Role of Self-produced Action in the Development of Causal Perception 
The findings reviewed above point to the conclusion that although infants become 
able to distinguish events based on their spatial and temporal differences between 4 and 
5½ months of age, causal perception does not emerge until around 6 months of age. 
However, the factors that influence the emergence and maturation of the ability to 
distinguish causal and non-causal events are not well understood. The experience-based 
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account of Piaget (1954) suggests that infants gradually construct representations of 
causes and their effects through repeated actions. Recent efforts to corroborate this 
account have met some success. 
The effects of infants’ own actions on their cognitive development have been 
investigated using a training paradigm commonly referred to as “Sticky Mittens” (SM) 
training (Needham, Barrett, & Peterman, 2002). This training task involves fitting 
prereaching infants with Velcro-covered mittens that allow them to grasp Velcro-covered 
objects. Thus, the task allows young infants to effectively manipulate objects at an age 
prior to their natural development of this ability. The SM task has been used to 
demonstrate that self-produced actions facilitate the emergence of abilities across a host 
of cognitive domains early in development. For example, infants who receive SM 
training demonstrate early changes in interest toward faces (Libertus & Needham, 2011; 
2014), increases in object-directed behaviors (Libertus & Needham, 2011; Needham, 
Barrett, & Peterman, 2002), development of three-dimensional object completion (Soska, 
Adolph & Johnson, 2010), and development of goal perception (Gerson & Woodward, 
2013; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005; Sommerville, Hildebrand & Crane, 
2008).  
 Rakison and Krogh (2012) recently conducted a SM training study to examine the 
effects of self-produced action on causal perception in 4½-month-olds. They 
hypothesized that providing 4½-month-olds with relevant causal action experience in the 
lab would facilitate their causal understanding. In Experiment 1, infants were divided into 
two training groups: a causal action group and a non-causal action group. Infants in the 
causal action group were fitted with Velcro mittens that allowed them to manipulate or 
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“pick up” Velcro covered balls. Each parent was instructed to keep their infant on their 
lap and to not interact with the infant in any other way while the child interacted with the 
Velcro-covered toys for 3 minutes. The non-causal action group completed an identical 
task in which the mittens were not covered in Velcro and the balls were glued to the tray 
so that they could not be manipulated. Across both conditions, the mittens were red and 
the toy balls were green. Upon completing the training phase, infants' causal perception 
was measured. Infants were habituated to a prototypical direct launching event in which a 
red ball contacted a green ball. These colors were designed to be consistent with the 
colors of the mittens and balls used in the training phase. Infants were then tested using 
three different reversed versions of the launching event: (1) a direct launching event in 
which the causal roles were familiar, (2) a “causal switch” direct launching event in 
which the causal roles of the objects were reversed (green contacted red), and (3) a non-
causal gap launching event (see Figure 5). Results of this experiment demonstrated that 
infants in the sticky mittens condition dishabituated to the causal switch event and the 
non-causal event indicating that they were sensitive to changes in causality. In contrast, 
the control group dishabituated to all of the test events, indicating that they responded 




Figure 5. Habituation and test events from Rakison and Krogh (2012). Figure 
reconstructed from original publication. 
 
Based on these findings, Rakison and Krogh (2012) attributed the emergence of 
causal perception to infants’ development of the ability to causally interact with objects. 
These results suggest that causal actions may be important for developing causal 
perception, but more evidence is needed before that conclusion can be made. There are 
several other factors that need to be considered. 
First, causal action experience contains rich, multimodal contingent input, 
producing feelings of causal or volitional effort as well as certain sights and haptic 
sensations (e.g. information about force, object weight, etc.). It is currently unknown how 
the sensation of agency, haptic input, and visual input are related to the emergence of 
causal perception. The two training conditions used by Rakison and Krogh not only 
contained completely different experiences of causality, they were associated with 
different visual, haptic, and proprioceptive experiences as well. During the causal SM 
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training task, infants caused the objects to move, but they also felt and saw the objects 
moving contingently with their actions. In the control task, infants did not make the 
objects move. Consequently, they also did not get to see or feel the green balls move 
contingently with the red mittens. In fact, they never saw the objects move at all. The 
control training condition used in Rakison and Krogh’s study therefore limits how the 
results can be interpreted. To better understand the role of self-produced causal action 
experience in the emergence of causal perception, infants’ experience of causal agency 
should be manipulated while contingent haptic, proprioceptive, and visual information 
remain constant.  
Second, Rakison and Krogh’s study, while tightly controlled, also failed to take 
the role of parental interaction into account. One crucial detail of their study that has been 
overlooked is that parents in both training conditions were instructed not to interact at all 
with their infants during training (D. Rakison, personal communication, April 22, 2016). 
In a more naturalistic setting outside of the lab, infants likely spend a great deal of time 
learning in the context of parent-child interactions. It has long been known that the social 
environment in which learning takes place can play an important role in learning 
outcomes and task performance (Vygotsky, 1987).  In fact, the SM task is a classic 
example of Vygotskian scaffolding because the task provides infants with a means to 
demonstrate a behavior (grasping) that is just beyond their developmental level and 
parents are typically allowed to provide social scaffolding through encouragement as well 
(Libertus & Needham, 2011, 2014). For example, Libertus and Needham (2010, 2014) 
examined the independent and combined effects of self-produced actions and parental 
encouragement (eye-contact, pointing, verbal cues, etc.) on infants subsequent reaching 
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behaviors and preference for faces. They found that neither self-produced actions nor 
parental encouragement during the object exploration training tasks were sufficient to 
facilitate increases in independent reaching behaviors or a robust preference for human 
faces. However, the combination of parental encouragement and self-produced action 
experience did facilitate increases on both measures. Thus, social factors related to 
pedagogy (i.e. parental encouragement) may constitute a mechanism that facilitates the 
development of causal perception.  
Putting it all together, it is unknown how passive experiences of causal object 
manipulations may contribute to the emergence of causal perception in infancy, but there 
is reason to believe that if passive experience were to work, it would be more likely to do 
so in the context of naturalistic parent-child interactions (e.g., Libertus & Needham, 
2014). Also, Rakison and Krogh (2012) found that their non-causal training condition did 
not produce causal perception. This suggests that non-causal actions in the absence of 
parental encouragement do not facilitate causal perception. However, it is possible that 
infants may learn about causality from non-agentive experiences in the context of a more 
naturalistic learning environment. Similarly, if causal perception originates from 
contingent haptic, proprioceptive and visual information, providing infants with passive 
object exploration experience that contains strong perceptual cues about causality could 
facilitate causal perception. Thus, a combination of passive object manipulation 
experience that contains rich contingent haptic, proprioceptive, and visual cues and 
parental interactions that are encouraging and motivating during training could 
potentially facilitate infants’ learning about causality. If this were the case, then the 
experience of causal agency could be ruled out definitively as the origin of causal 
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perception, and the contingent haptic, proprioceptive, and visual information that result 
from self-produced causal object manipulation could be implicated as the source of the 
ability to infer causality from visual collision events. 
The Present Study 
The primary purpose of this dissertation project was to examine the unique 
contribution of self-produced causal action experience during SM training to young 
infants’ learning about the causal interactions between objects. The goal of the current 
study was two-fold: (1) to determine whether the self-produced nature of infants’ object 
interactions during active SM training is the driving mechanism behind the task’s 
facilitative effects, or whether perceptual aspects (haptic, proprioceptive, visual) of active 
experience are sufficient for learning to occur, and (2) to assess the impact of active 
experience on infants’ causal learning in a more naturalistic situation. To address the first 
goal, infants’ causal perception learning outcomes were compared after infants received 
either active or passive SM training that controlled for contingent perceptual experiences 
(haptic, proprioceptive, and visual). The second goal was assessed by comparing infants’ 
learning outcomes following active SM training in which parents were either restricted 
from interacting or encouraged to interact with their infants throughout the task. 
Design 
 In the present study, 4 ½-month-old infants received a brief in-lab SM training 
experience (see Figure 6) that was modeled after the design of Rakison and Krogh (2012) 
and completed a causal perception habituation task modeled after the task used by Cohen 
and Amsel (1998). To address the aims of the study, infants were randomly assigned to 
one of three SM training conditions (Passive/Interaction, Active/Interaction, Active/No 
Interaction) or a control condition. Infants in the three SM training conditions completed 
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the habituation task immediately following training to assess the facilitative effects of the 
various SM training manipulations. Infants in the control condition received no training 
prior to completing the causal perception habituation task; the control condition was 
included to get a baseline measure of 4-½-month-olds’ performance on the causal 
perception habituation task. 
 
 
Figure 6. An infant and his mother participating in a “Sticky Mittens” training task. 
 
 Infants’ perception of causality was tested using a visual habituation paradigm 
based on Cohen and Amsel (1998).1 Infants were habituated to either a non-causal delay 
or gap version of a typical Michottian launching event. After the habituation phase, three 
test trials were presented: (1) familiar, (2) non-causal, and (3) causal. The overall pattern 
of looking times across the three test trials was used to determine whether infants 
responded to perceptual differences between the events, or on the basis of causality. 
Importantly, the causal and non-causal events both differed perceptually from the familiar 
                                                 
1 The habituation task used by Cohen and Amsel (1998) was chosen because it contains a 
true “familiar” test trial, which allows for direct comparisons between the familiar, non-
causal, and causal test trials. Including a truly familiar trial during test is considered a 
best practice in the use of habituation paradigms (Cohen, 2004; Oakes, 2010). 
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event; the familiar and non-causal events differed from one another along two perceptual 
dimensions (spatial and temporal), and the familiar and causal events differed along one 
perceptual dimension (see Figure 7). Infants were judged to respond to the perceptual 
differences between the test events if they produced looking times that were significantly 
greater for both the causal and non-causal trials compared to the familiar trial (see Figure 
8). Alternatively, infants were judged to successfully perceive causality (i.e., interpret the 
causal event as categorically different from the familiar event, but interpret the non-
causal event as categorically similar to the familiar event) if they produced a looking time 
to the causal event that was significantly greater than looking time toward the familiar 




Figure 7. Distance model of the perceptual differences (distances) between the 
Michottian launching test events used in the present study (adapted from Cohen, Amsel, 




Figure 8. Visualization of how infants’ test trial looking times are interpreted based on the 
design of the current study. 
  
Predictions 
It was hypothesized that infants in the no training (control) condition would 
demonstrate a perceptual response pattern during the causal perception habituation 
experiment, replicating previous studies of infants’ causal perception for this age range 
(Desrochers, 1999, Cohen & Amsel, 1998).  
Regarding the first goal of the current study, which was to determine the role of 
self-produced action versus perceptual/haptic factors in facilitating causal perception, it 
was hypothesized that the self-produced nature of infants’ object interactions during 
active SM training would be the primary mechanism that would facilitate causal 
perception. It was expected that only those infants who received a form of active SM 
training would successfully distinguish causal and non-causal events during the looking 














perception, it would indicate that contingent visual, proprioceptive, and haptic perceptual 
experience is not sufficient for the emergence of causal perception. Moreover, this result 
combined with pattern of response hypothesized to occur in the no training (control) 
condition would suggest that causal perception is an ability that originates from direct 
self-produced action experiences within the environment. 
Alternatively, in the case that perceptual aspects (haptic, proprioceptive, visual) of 
active experience are sufficient for learning to occur, and active experience is not 
necessary, it was hypothesized that perceptual experience in the passive condition may 
facilitate causal perception. This possibility is bolstered by research on the role of 
attention allocation during reaching tasks in infancy. Boudreau and Bushnell (2000) 
found that when infants attempted to achieve a goal that involved a demanding motor 
action, attentional resources shifted from the goal to the action itself. Given this finding, 
passive physical experience in the Passive/Interaction condition of the current study 
could potentially provide an ideal tradeoff between reaching demands and learning 
success, as passive physical experience could free up attentional resources that could be 
allocated toward learning about causality. If the combination of haptic and visual 
experience during sticky mittens training is sufficient for learning about causality to 
occur, it was hypothesized that infants in the Passive/Interaction condition would 
demonstrate the ability to distinguish between causal and non-causal launching events 
following training.  
Regarding the second goal of the current study, which was to assess the impact of 
active experience on infants’ causal learning in a more naturalistic situation, it was 
hypothesized that a more real-world, socially-interactive form of SM training would 
 29 
serve to promote and enhance any learning that would occur in the Active/Interaction or 
Passive/Interaction conditions. Specifically, it was hypothesized that infants in the 
Active/Interaction condition would replicate the effects found in the Active/No 
Interaction condition, and that the addition of parental interaction would potentially serve 








 The sample consisted of sixty 4-month-old infants (30 girls and 30 boys, Mage = 
4.21, SD = 0.47, Range = 3.45 – 5.29). All participants were healthy, full-term (i.e., 
gestational age of > 36 weeks and birth weight > 5lbs) infants with normal vision and 
hearing. The racial/ethnic background of the sample was 84% Caucasian, 10% African 
American, 5% Hispanic, and 2% Asian. Participants were recruited from birth records 
obtained from the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (KYCHFS), flyers, 
Facebook postings targeted to new parents, university listserv, and via word of mouth. 
Families with infants in the desired age range were contacted via mail, e-mail, Facebook, 
and/or phone call and invited to participate. Families who volunteered received a small 
gift (t-shirt, bib, etc.) to thank them for their participation. An additional 44 infants 
participated in the current study, but their data had to be omitted from the final sample 
(see Data Reduction in Results section). 
Procedure 
 After parents provided consent to participate and filled out a demographic 
questionnaire, infants then participated in SM training and a causal perception habituation 
task. Additionally, parents filled out a caregiver perception rating questionnaire 
immediately following the SM training session and completed the Early Motor 
Questionnaire (EMQ) measure, typically after all other experimental procedures had been 
completed.  
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 Sticky Mittens Training 
 Materials. A pair of custom-made red “sticky mittens” with red Velcro (loop) 
sewn to the palms (fashioned to resemble the “sticky mittens” used by Needham, Barrett 
& Peterman, 2002; Rakison & Krogh, 2012) were worn over infants’ hands during all SM 
training sessions. A custom-made set of four yellow “sticky toys” were made from table 
tennis balls (40mm in diameter). Each ball was covered in lens-shaped strips of yellow 
Velcro (hook) that were affixed to the balls in a beach-ball pattern using non-toxic 
thermoplastic hot-melt adhesive (hot glue). The sticky mittens and toys were presented 
on a white wooden tray measuring 34.61 cm x 34.61 cm (see Figure 9). The sticky toys 
rested on half-inch flat washers that were affixed to the tray approximately half an inch 
apart in a square pattern centered 6.35 cm from one edge of the tray.  
 Procedure. Each infant was randomly assigned to one of three SM training 
conditions or a no training condition (see below for details). Infants assigned to the no 
training condition completed the habituation task first, and then completed the SM 
training session. Infants assigned to any of the three experimental conditions completed 




Figure 9. SM training materials used in the present study. 
 
 During the SM training phase of the experiment, infants were seated in a parent’s 
lap at a small table across from an experimenter in a well-lit room. Parents were asked to 
support their infants at the waist and to sit as close to the table as possible. In the event 
that the parent’s lap was not high enough for the child to sit at a height that allowed the 
infants’ arms to reach the toys over the front of the table, a small pillow was placed 
underneath the infant. Once the infant was seated close enough to the table and at an 
appropriate height, the experimenter placed the training materials on the table in front of 
the infant, and the parent was asked to fit the mittens over the infants' hands. Parents then 
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received verbal instructions read from a script by an experimenter that differed based on 
training condition (see Appendices A-C). Instructions were adapted from a script used by 
Libertus and Needham (2011, 2014). Each SM training session lasted approximately 10 
minutes. If an infant became fussy during the training session, the experimenter asked the 
parent if they wanted to give their infant a short break in order to calm them and continue 
the session. If the parent deemed the infant too fussy to continue then the play session 
ended.  All infants had to complete at least 3 minutes of training to be included in the 
final dataset.  Video and audio data from the SM training sessions were recorded using a 
webcam and microphone attached to a MacBook Pro laptop that was placed 
approximately three feet away from the table at an angle of 45° to the front and left of the 
infant-parent dyad. A second, backup video recording of the SM training session was 
recorded using a Canon VC-C50i camera that was located approximately two-and-a-half 
feet away from the table at an angle of 90° to the left of the infant-parent dyad. 
 Types of Training. In all of the training conditions parents were instructed to 
draw their infant’s attention to the training stimuli and demonstrate once how the toys 
stick to the mittens by guiding the child’s hand to the toy and making it stick. Once the 
toy was attached to the mitten, parents were asked to shake the child’s hand to draw 
attention to it again. After 10 seconds the toy was removed from the mitten and replaced 
on the tray. After the demonstration procedure was completed, the instructions parents 
received differed based on condition. The instructional and procedural differences 
between each of the training conditions are briefly described below. 
 In the Active/Interaction (AI) group, parents were instructed to allow their baby 
to reach for the toys independently while encouraging their reaches by pointing at the 
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toys and saying, “Can you get it?” Parents were also instructed to praise their child’s 
successful reaches. Each time the child picked up a toy with their mitten they were 
allowed to inspect the toy on the mitten for approximately 10 seconds before it was 
removed from the mitten and replaced on the tray. This procedure was repeated for the 
duration of the session. These same instructions were also given to parents whose child 
was assigned to the CTRL group (see Appendix A). 
 In the Active/No Interaction (AN) group, the training task was identical to the AP 
training described above, except that parents were specifically instructed that they were 
not allowed to talk at all during the training session (i.e., parents were instructed not to 
encourage or verbally reinforce their child’s reaching behaviors; see Appendix B).  
 In the Passive/Interaction (PI) group, parents were instructed to repeat the initial 
demonstration process (guiding the child’s hand to the object, waving the object in front 
of them, etc.) for the duration of the training session. Parents were also instructed to 
provide encouragement as if the child were acting independently (e.g. by saying “Can 
you get it?”), and to praise the child when the parent helped the child to pick up one of 
the toys (see Appendix C).  
 Causal Perception Task 
 Infants’ perception of causality was measured using a habituation task similar to 
the Gap and Delay conditions previously used by Cohen & Amsel (1998).  In this task, 
infants watched one of two non-causal events (gap or delay) during the habituation phase, 
and then saw both of the non-causal events and a causal event during the test phase. 
Habituation condition (gap, delay) and test event order was randomly assigned and 
counter-balanced.   
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 Stimuli. The stimuli for the causal perception task were modeled after the stimuli 
used by two previous studies of infants’ causal perception (Cohen & Amsel, 1998; 
Rakison & Krogh, 2012), and consisted of animations of three different Michottian 
events that were rendered in Microsoft Powerpoint and then converted to Quicktime 
movie (.mov) files. The animations depicted the sequential movement of a red and a 
yellow circle across the field of view. In each of the events, a yellow circle was first 
shown at rest in the middle of the screen and then a red circle entered the scene from the 
left and advanced toward the yellow circle. Then, the red circle remained in the center of 
the screen as the yellow circle moved toward the right edge of the screen and eventually 
disappeared. No sounds were played during any of the events. The duration of the events 
ranged from 8 to 9 seconds, depending on the type of event. The circles travelled across a 
50-inch (127 cm) television screen at a rate of approximately 14.3 cm/s. Each circle 
measured 20 cm in diameter and subtended approximately 9° of visual angle on the 
screen, with the total movement from left to right across the screen subtending 
approximately 51° of visual angle. At the end of each event, a blue “curtain” descended 
over a period of 2 seconds to cover the event space, and then ascended over a period of 2 
seconds to reveal the yellow circle in the center of the screen at the start of the next 
repetition of the event.  
 As depicted in Figure 10, the causal perception stimulus set consisted of three 
types of Michottian launching events (one causal and two non-causal). In all three events, 
the red circle advanced from just outside the left edge of the screen toward the yellow 
circle resting in the middle of the screen. In the direct launching (causal) event, the red 
circle ended its movement when it collided with the yellow circle causing the yellow 
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circle to move off to the right edge of the screen. The delay (non-causal) launching event 
was also identical to the direct launching event except that when the red ball made 
contact with the yellow ball, there was a 1 s delay before the yellow ball began to move. 
The spatial gap (non-causal) event was identical to the direct launching event except that 
the yellow circle began its movement toward the right edge of the screen even though red 
circle stopped before reaching the yellow circle (creating a spatial gap of approximately 
10.3 cm). 
   




 Procedure. During the habituation task, infants were seated in a parent’s lap 
approximately 120 cm away from a 50-inch Panasonic plasma television that was used to 
display stimuli. The experiment room was dimly lit and soundproofed to prevent 
distractions. Parents were instructed to avoid pointing, talking, or interacting with their 
infant during the procedure in order to minimize parental influence on infants’ looking 
behaviors. An experimenter was seated in an adjacent room and observed infants 
throughout the experiment on a 15-inch JVC closed-circuit monitor that displayed a live 
video feed from a Canon VC-C50i camera that was concealed below the stimulus display. 
Presentation of stimuli was controlled using Habit X 1.0 software (Cohen, Atkinson, & 
Chaput, 2004) running on a Macintosh Power Mac G5 computer. At the beginning of the 
task an experimenter displayed an attention-getting video, which consisted of a neon-
green colored circle that pulsated in the center of a black background while a “dinging” 
noise played. When the infant fixated on the attention-getting stimulus, the experimenter 
pressed the “enter” key on the computer’s keyboard to initiate the presentation of the 
stimuli. The attention-getting stimulus was displayed briefly in between each trial of the 
experiment to reorient infants’ attention to the center of the display. Videos of each 
experiment session were recorded to a DVD so that they could be recoded offline later 
for reliability by naïve, independent experimenters. 
  The habituation task was infant-controlled, meaning that the length of stimulus 
presentation on each trial depended on how long infants looked at the display. Stimulus 
presentation advanced to the next trial when an infant looked away from the screen for 
more than 1 second, or after a maximum duration of 30 seconds of looking had 
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accumulated. Infants were randomly assigned to be habituated to one the two non-causal 
Michottian events (either Gap or Delay), during the habituation phase.  Infants were 
deemed to have met the habituation criterion when their average looking time for any set 
of three consecutive trials was less than or equal to 50% of their average looking time 
over the first three trials. The experiment automatically advanced to the test phase when 
this habituation criterion was reached, or after 20 habituation trials had been presented. 
During the test phase, infants viewed three different test trials: a familiar event (identical 
to the habituation event), a novel non-causal event (either Gap or Delay depending on the 
habituation stimulus), and a novel causal event (Causal). The order of the presentation of 
these test trials was counterbalanced across infants to control for any potential order 
effects. The reliability of the looking time data was checked by a second trained 
experimenter for a random sample of 25% of the infants included in the final dataset. The 
correlation between the looking times recorded by the live experimenter and the offline 
experimenter was high, r = .99. 
 Early Motor Questionnaire 
 Motor development was measured using the Early Motor Questionnaire (EMQ; 
Libertus & Landa, 2013). The EMQ measures infants’ developmental level across a 
variety of motor abilities (e.g. reaching, sitting, crawling, etc.) and contexts (e.g. sitting at 
a table, playing on the floor, etc.). The measure consists of 128 items scored on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale. The items are scored on a scale ranging from -2 (certain the infant does 
not show the behavior) to +2 (certain the infant does show the behavior and can 
remember a specific instance). The EMQ is divided into 3 subscales: Gross Motor, Fine 
Motor, and Perception-Action domains. The EMQ has been shown to be highly 
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correlated with age across all three sub-scales (Libertus & Landa, 2013) and also shows 
high concurrent and predictive validity with the corresponding sections of the Mullen 
Scales of Early Learning (MSEL) and the Peabody Developmental Motor Scales (PDMS-
2).  
Caregiver Perception Rating Scale 
 Immediately following the SM training session in all conditions parents were 
asked to complete a modified version of a caregiver perception debriefing questionnaire 
that is included in the Communication and Symbolic Behavior Scales (CSBS; Wetherby 
& Prizant, 2002). Parents were asked to indicate whether their child’s performance during 
the SM training session was less than typical, typical, or greater than typical for the 
following six items: (1) alertness, (2) emotional reaction, (3) level of interest and 
attention, (4) comfort level, (5) level of activity, and (6) enjoyment (see Appendix D). 
This questionnaire was included in order to assess whether infants’ performance during 




Only data from infants who successfully completed the SM training task and the 
causal perception habituation task, and whose parents completed the motor development 
measure were included in the final sample. Data from twenty-eight infants had to be 
removed from the final sample for the following specific reasons: (a) parent failure to 
comply with task instructions (n = 3, SM training), (b) infant fussiness (n = 2, SM 
training; n = 4, causal perception), (c) parent interference (n = 1, causal perception), (d) 
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sleepiness and/or inattention (n = 10, causal perception), (d) failure to meet habituation 
criterion (n = 8, causal perception). An additional sixteen infants were not included 
because they demonstrated a familiarity preference (i.e., looked longer at the familiar trial 
than the two novel trials) during the test phase of the causal perception task.2 This 
exclusion data broken down by condition can be found in Appendix E. 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Summary statistics of measures used in the preliminary analyses broken down by 
condition are displayed in Table 1. 
 Age. In order to demonstrate that infants did not differ in age across training 
groups, a one-way ANOVA was performed on mean age. Results indicated that age did 
not differ across conditions, F(3, 56) = 0.28, p = .84. 
 Motor Development. In order to demonstrate that infants did not differ in terms of 
their motor development across training groups, a one-way ANOVA was performed on 
mean EMQ composite score. Results indicated that composite scores on the EMQ did not 
differ across conditions, F(3, 56) = 0.49, p = .69. 
 Gender. In order to rule out any potential effects of gender on infants’ test trial 
looking behaviors, a 2 (Gender) X 3 (Test trial) mixed model ANOVA was performed on 
mean looking time for each test trial. A main effect of gender was not found, F(1, 58) 
= .041, p = .84, indicating that infants’ overall looking time at test did not differ based on 
gender. Also, a test trial by gender interaction was not found, F(2, 116) = 0.11, p = .90, 
indicating that infants’ looking times during the test trials did not differ based on gender. 
                                                 
2 The inclusion of infants who show a familiarity preference serves to increase variance, 
lowers power, and can generally lead to misleading results (Cohen, 2004). 
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These results suggest that gender was not an important factor and was not included in 
subsequent analyses. 
 Habituation Stimulus. Infants were randomly assigned to view one of two 
possible non-causal events during the habituation phase of the current study. In order to 
rule out potential effects of habituation stimulus on infants’ test trial looking behaviors, a 
2 (Hab stimulus) X 3 (Test trial) mixed model ANOVA was performed on mean looking 
time during the test trials. Neither a main effect of habituation stimulus, F(1, 58) = 0.25, 
p = .61, nor a test trial by habituation stimulus interaction was not found, F(2, 116) = 
0.32, p = .72, indicating that infants’ response patterns toward the test trials did not differ 
based on habituation stimulus. These results suggest that habituation stimulus was not an 
important factor. Thus, test trial data are collapsed across habituation stimulus in all 
subsequent analyses. 
 Number of Trials to Reach Habituation Criterion. Rakison and Krogh (2012) 
found that infants in the active SM training group in their study required fewer trials to 
habituate than those in their control group. In order to test whether there were differences 
in the number of trials infants needed to habituate across the four training conditions in 
the present study, a one-way ANOVA and planned comparisons were performed. No 
differences were found between training conditions in the number of trials to reach the 
habituation criterion, F(3, 56) = 1.23, p = .31, η2 = .06. Moreover, planned comparisons 
revealed no significant differences in the number of trials to habituate between the 
control condition and each of the three training conditions (all ps >.34).  
 Average Looking Time on First Three Habituation Trials. To test whether there 
were differences in infants’ initial level of interest in the habituation launching event 
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based on SM training condition, a one-way ANOVA was performed on infants’ mean 
looking time to the first three habituation trials. No differences were found between 






Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Preliminary and Exploratory Analyses 
Measure Total (n = 60) CTRL (n = 16) PI (n = 16) AN (n = 14) AI (n = 14) 
Age (in months) 
M = 4.21 
SD = 0.48 
M = 4.14 
SD = 0.41 
M = 4.18 
SD = 0.58 
M = 4.25 
SD = 0.47 
M = 4.29 
SD = 0.46 
Early Motor Questionnaire (EMQ) 
Composite Score 
M = -127.3 
SD = 29.82 
M = -131.38 
SD = 18.37 
M = -121.94 
SD = 47.23 
M = -123.43 
SD = 22.14 
M = -132.64 
SD = 21.89 
Gender (frequency) 
Male = 30 
Female = 30 
Male = 7 
Female = 9 
Male = 9 
Female = 7 
Male = 8 
Female = 6 
Male = 6 
Female = 8 
Habituation Stimulus (frequency) 
Gap = 30 
Delay = 30 
Gap = 9 
Delay = 7 
Gap = 7 
Delay = 9 
Gap = 6 
Delay = 8 
Gap = 8 
Delay = 6 
Number of Trials to Reach 
Habituation Criterion 
M = 9.65 
SD = 4.09 
M = 9.38 
SD = 4.62 
M = 10.06 
SD = 3.21 
M = 11.00 
SD = 4.64 
M = 8.14 
SD = 3.63 
Average Looking Time on First 
Three Habituation Trials (s/trial) 
M = 18.65 
SD = 7.52 
M = 16.84 
SD = 7.96 
M = 21.93 
SD = 6.58 
M = 17.98 
SD = 8.29 
M = 17.65 





Main Analyses: Effects of SM Training Conditions on Causal Perception 
 Infants’ mean looking times during the test trials for each condition are presented 
in Figure 11. The critical question in the present study was whether infants’ patterns of 
looking times toward the familiar, causal and non-causal test trials differ across 
conditions and depending on the training condition are more or less consistent with a 
“conceptual” response or a “perceptual” response. To recap, it was reasoned that if 
infants respond on the basis of the conceptual change from habituation to test, after being 
habituated to a non-causal event, they should dishabituate to the causal test event (which 
is novel conceptually), but not the novel non-causal test event (which is familiar 
conceptually). On the other hand, if they responded on the basis of perceptual differences 
during test, infants would be expected to dishabituate to both the causal and novel non-
causal test trials, which are both perceptually novel. In order to test address this question, 
a series of planned comparisons were conducted to compare infants’ looking times 
toward the familiar, novel non-causal, and causal events in each condition. The method of 
testing predictions by omitting the omnibus ANOVA in favor of planned comparisons 
has been thoroughly validated (Howell, 1996; Rosenthal, Rosnow & Rubin, 2000; 











 Based on previous findings (e.g. Cohen & Amsel, 1998), it was hypothesized that 
4½-month-old infants in the control condition would demonstrate a pattern of looking at 
test that was indicative of a perceptual response (i.e., dishabituation to both the novel 
non-causal test trial and the novel causal test trial). Consistent with this hypothesis, 
planned comparisons for the control condition revealed that infants’ looked significantly 
longer at the non-causal test trial than the familiar test trial, t(15) = -2.67, p = .02, dz 
= .67.3 Additionally, they looked significantly longer during the causal test trial than in 
the familiar trial, t(15) = -2.23, p = .04, dz = .56. Together, this pattern of results indicates 
that, as hypothesized, 4½-month-old infants in the control condition responded to the 
perceptual differences between each of the test events.  
 Passive training (PI) was hypothesized to produce a response pattern at test 
similar to that found in the control condition. However, unlike previous studies, the 
passive training condition used in the present study provided infants with contingent 
haptic, proprioceptive, and visual experiences that could be sufficient to facilitate causal 
perception. Thus, it was also possible that passive training could have facilitated causal 
perception, in which case infants should look similarly toward the familiar and non-
causal test trials and only dishabituate to the causal test trial. In the PI condition, infants 
looked significantly longer at the non-causal test trial than the familiar test trial, t(15) = -
2.53, p = .02, dz = .63. However, infants’ looking time toward the familiar test trial and 
causal test trial did not differ significantly, t(15) = -1.32, p = .21, dz = .33. At first glance, 
this pattern of results does not fit precisely with either of the hypothesized patterns of 
                                                 
3 All effect size calculations for planned comparisons were conducted using G*Power 3.1 






results.  Yet, given that infants dishabituated to the novel non-causal test trial, it is clear 
that they were not responding to that test event on the basis of causality and instead were 
likely responding to the novel perceptual cues. The reason a statistically significant 
difference between the familiar and causal test trials was not found may be due to the 
relatively higher mean and SD on the familiar test event in that condition. To explore this 
further, two infants were omitted from this analysis for looking greater than 2SD above 
the grand mean (cut off: 15.5 s) on the familiar test trial (29.4 s and 18.5 s). When these 
outliers were omitted from the data, planned comparisons showed that infants 
dishabituated to both the novel test trials (ps<.05). Thus, this pattern of results suggests 
that infants responded on the basis of perceptual changes in the events and that passive 
SM training does not facilitate the emergence of causal perception in 4½-month-old 
infants.  
 The two conditions that provided infants with active training, AN and AI, were 
hypothesized to facilitate infants’ causal perception in the present study. Planned 
comparisons for the AN condition revealed that there was no difference between infants’ 
looking times toward the familiar test trial and the non-causal test trial, t(13) = -1.08, p 
= .30, dz = .29. Critically, infants’ looking times toward the causal test trial were 
significantly higher than looking times toward the familiar test trial, t(13) = -2.65, p 
= .02, dz = .71. This pattern reflects a pattern similar to that of the 6¼-month-olds tested 
by Cohen and Amsel (1998) and indicates that active training with no parental interaction 
facilitates causal perception in 4½-month-olds. This finding also replicates the findings in 





 For the AI condition, which was designed to provide infants with active SM 
training experience in a more naturalistic context (i.e., with parent interaction), planned 
comparisons revealed that infants looked significantly longer at the non-causal test trial 
than the familiar test trial, t(13) = -2.76, p = .02, dz = .74. No difference was found in 
infants’ looking times toward the familiar test trial and causal test trial, t(13) = -1.66, p 
= .12, dz = .44. As was done in the PI condition, one outlier was omitted for looking 18.5 
s on the familiar test trial. Planned comparisons after the omission of this data point 
revealed a difference between the familiar and causal test trial that approached statistical 
significance, t(12) = -2.04, p = .065. Surprisingly, the overall pattern of test results for the 
AI condition is consistent with the conclusion that infants responded on the basis of 
perceptual cues and suggests that active SM training with parental interaction does not 
facilitate the emergence of causal perception in 4-½ -month-old infants.  
Exploratory Analyses: Potential Explanations for the Failure of the AI Condition 
 In order to gain a better understanding of why active training combined with 
parental interaction (AI) failed to facilitate causal perception while active training alone 
(AN) produced a positive learning outcome, differences between the AI and AN 
conditions were explored on several important infant characteristics (see Table 1) and 
parent perceptions (see Table 2) as well as infant object exploration behaviors during the 
SM task (see Table 3).  
 Infant Characteristics and Parent Perceptions. No differences were found 
between the AI and AN groups in terms of age (p = .81), number of trials to habituate (p 
= .15), EMQ composite score (p = .51), or total duration of looking at test (p = .34) (see 





were also examined by comparing scores on each of the six items from the Caregiver 
Perception Rating Scale (see Table 2). Parent ratings indicated that infants in the AI and 
AN groups did not differ statistically significantly in terms of their alertness (p = .38), 
emotional reaction (p = .88), level of interest and attention (p = .07), comfort level (p 
= .90), level of activity (p = .67), or enjoyment (p = .39). These analyses provide 
evidence that the difference in learning outcomes observed on the causal perception task 
between the two active groups is not easily explained by any of the measured infant 
characteristics or parents’ perceptions of their infants’ performance during training.  
 
Table 2 
Means of Parents’ Ratings  of Their Infants’ Experience During SM Training 
Measure CTRL (n = 11) PI (n = 13) AN (n = 12) AI (n = 10) 
Alertness 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.0 
Emotional Reaction 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.7 
Level of Interest and 
Attention 
1.8 1.6 1.7 2.1 
Level of Comfort 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 
Level of Activity 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.9 
Enjoyment 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.9 





 Infant Object Exploration Behaviors during SM Training. To more objectively 
explore whether infants’ object-directed behaviors differed during training, several 
behavioral variables from the play session were coded for a preliminary sample of eight 
infants in both the AN and AI conditions (see Table 3). Due to the lower sample size, 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted and indicated that infants’ 
behaviors did not differ during the SM training session with regard to the total number of 
successful reaches (p = .20), the number of successful single-handed reaches (p = .28), 
the number of successful bimanual (two-handed) reaches (p = .57), the total duration that 
objects were attached to the mittens (p = .38), and the average duration that objects were 
attached to the mittens per touch (p = .72). These preliminary analyses suggest that 
infants in the two active groups produced similar behaviors and presumably had similar 
opportunities to learn about causality during their respective SM training sessions. Thus 
far, no evidence has been found that the difference in learning outcomes between the two 








Summary and Comparisons of Measures of Infants’ Object-directed Reaching 
Behaviors During the SM Training Session Between the AN and AI Groups 
Measure AN (n = 8) AI (n = 8) Mann-Whitney U p-value 
Number of 
successful reaches 
Med = 10.0 Med = 17.0 19.0 .20 
Successful single-
handed reaches 
Med = 10.0 Med = 16.0 21.5 .28 
Successful bimanual 
reaches 
Med = 0.0 Med = 2.0 26.0 .58 
Duration that objects 
were attached to 
mittens (s) 
Med = 150.5 Med = 180.5 23.0 .38 
Average duration 
objects were attached 
to mittens (s/reach) 








 The primary goal of this dissertation project was to determine whether the self-
produced nature of infants’ object interactions during active SM training is the driving 
mechanism behind the task’s facilitative effects, or whether perceptual aspects (haptic, 
proprioceptive, visual) of active experience are sufficient for learning to occur. The 
results of the present study indicate that causal perception can be facilitated through self-
produced actions. Infants who received active SM training with no parent interaction 
demonstrated a pattern of response during the habituation task that is indicative of causal 
perception. Importantly, in the absence of self-produced action, the sensory cues to 
causality that are generated during SM training are not sufficient to facilitate young 
infants’ learning about causality, at least not in the presence of parent interaction. 
 The findings of the current study, along with those of Rakison and Krogh (2012), 
strongly implicate the experience of self-produced causal actions as the mechanism by 
which causal perception arises. The results presented here suggest that the developmental 
progression previously observed for infants’ causal perception between 4 and 6 months of 
age (e.g., Cohen & Amsel, 1998) may be the result of the development of the ability to 
reach for and manipulate objects, which occurs over this same period of development. 
Perhaps, due their limited motor abilities, 4-month-old infants have simply not yet had 
the appropriate physical experiences that help catalyze the development of causal 
perception. From this perspective, one interesting prediction is that young infants who are 
motorically advanced may naturally become capable of causal perception at an earlier age 





 The current study demonstrates that it is not the case that infants as young as 4 
months of age are cognitively incapable of causal perception, but rather they are capable 
of causal perception if given the “right” type of experience. The second goal of the 
present study was to assess the impact of active experience on infants’ causal learning 
while using a more naturalistic version of a previously successful in-lab training task (i.e., 
the task used by Rakison & Krogh, 2012). It was predicted that both active training 
conditions would facilitate infants’ causal perception. Surprisingly, a discrepancy was 
found between the learning outcomes of infants in the two active training conditions. 
Infants who received active training with parental interaction demonstrated a pattern of 
response during the habituation task that indicated that these infants responded to the 
perceptual differences between the events, rather than the conceptual difference between 
causal and non-causal events. Having ruled out differences in motor development and 
performance during the training task as potential explanations for the difference in 
learning outcomes between the two active training conditions, it seems likely that 
parental interaction may have caused an interference effect in the present study. These 
results suggest that infants are better able to learn about causality from self-produced 
object explorations experiences that do not involve parental interactions. 
In the current study, infants learning about causality may have been hindered by 
parent interactions for several reasons. For instance, when learning a novel motor skill 
(e.g., sticky mittens training), attention may be focused on producing the physical 
movement itself, rather than focused on the movement’s effects (Wulf, 2007; Wulf & 
Prinz, 2001; Wulf, Shea, & Lewthwaite, 2010). With further training on the motor skill 





may shift their attention toward the effect of their movements. This shift from an internal 
focus on movements to an external focus on the movement’s effects has been shown to 
promote learning in adults (Tostika & Wulf, 2003). Parent interactions during the SM 
task may serve to distract infants’ attention away from the effects of their actions toward 
dyadic social interactions that are presumably more salient, which may hinder learning 
(Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). Allowing infants to sustain their attention without 
interruption in the AN condition may have been an important feature of the training task 
that helped facilitate infants’ learning. Compared to SM training in which parents do not 
interact, training that involves parent interaction provided a greater opportunity for 
infants’ attention to be diverted away from the relevant causal object interactions that 
occur during the task.  
Furthermore, the style of interaction parents employ during the SM task may be 
an important factor that affects infant learning outcomes. Evidence from studies of infant 
language learning demonstrates that a directive style of interaction (i.e., behaviors or 
verbalizations that attempt to control infants’ behaviors or redirect attention) hinders 
learning (Marfo, 1992; Mahoney & Neville-Smith, 1996). The negative effects of 
directive parent-child interactions are thought to result because parent interactions that 
cause infants to redeploy their attention may tax infants’ cognitive abilities resulting in a 
disruption of learning. Infants’ shifting attention in response to a parental request may 
negatively affect infants’ object manipulations, requiring more effort than simply 
sustaining attentional focus (Landry & Chapiesky, 1989; Rocissanoo & Yatchmink, 
1983). Thus, it is possible that parental attempts to redirect attention during SM training 





effect on infant learning outcomes (Tomasello & Farrar, 1986; Akhtar, Dunham, & 
Dunham, 1991). More research is needed to better understand the role of parental 
interactions in infants learning from SM training and the conditions under which parental 
interactions may help or hinder the development of causal perception. Future work 
should examine whether parents exhibit directive interactions during SM training that 
may explain infants’ failure to learn about causality from object exploration experiences 
that include parent interactions.  
 One question that falls out of the line of research presented in the current study is 
what exactly is being learned during the SM training that is being transferred to infants’ 
performance on the causal perception task? Interestingly, the causal relationship 
demonstrated by the sticky mittens experience (i.e., that the red mitten attaches to the 
yellow ball to cause it to move contingently) is different from the causal relationship 
modeled in the habituation events (i.e., the red object bumps into yellow object to cause it 
to move independent of the red object). It seems then that the general idea of “cause” is 
being learned from the task rather than the precise type of causal relationship. But how 
robust is infants’ early notion of “cause” following SM training and throughout the first 
year of life? There is some evidence to suggest that infants’ early concept or 
representation of causality is still highly input driven. For example, in a follow-up 
experiment, Rakison and Krogh (2012) tested whether infants would generalize their 
learning about causality from an active SM training task involving blue mittens and 
yellow toys to a set of habituation events that depicted a red ball colliding with a green 
ball. They found no evidence of causal perception when the colors of the agent (mitten) 





Cohen (1990) found that when the objects depicted in launching events were visually 
complex, 10-month-olds were able to discriminate between causal and non-causal version 
of the events, but 6-month-olds failed to show evidence of causal perception. This pattern 
does not exist when simpler stimuli are used (Oakes, 1994). Together, this evidence 
suggests that infants’ early ability to infer causality from visual events is quite fragile. 
Although the present study suggests that causal perception originates from early self-
produced actions and can generalize to a novel causal relationship (i.e., a hand in mitten 
carrying a toy is generalized to a ball launching another ball), the concept of causality 
certainly continues to undergo a great deal of development over the first year of life, and 
beyond. 
 Michotte (1963) and others have contended that causal perception is an innate 
ability. The present study included a randomized, same-aged control group in which 
infants received no training prior to the measurement of their ability to perceive the 
difference between causal and non-causal events. The inclusion of the control condition 
makes the present study the first to definitively demonstrate that causal perception arises 
as the result of direct experience actively manipulating objects. When taken together, the 
results found for the AN condition and the control condition lead to the conclusion that 
causal perception is an acquired ability. The results presented in the present study imply 
that causal perception is an ability that requires top-down input derived through active 
object-manipulation experiences. Thus, Michotte’s assertion that causal perception is an 
automatic, irresistible perceptual phenomenon encapsulated from top-down influence is 
not supported by the current study. On the contrary, the present study supports several 





manipulating objects constitute the mechanism by which causal perception arises (James, 
1890; Maine de Biran, in Michotte, 1963; Piaget, 1954; White, 2009). Moreover, with 
regard to the origin of causal cognition, Michotte (1963) and others have argued that 
causal perception is a purely visual phenomenon that is separate from causal inference. 
However, the results of the present study demonstrate that infants’ independent self-
produced causal actions can facilitate causal perception in infancy at an age when causal 
perception has not yet naturally developed. These results, then, imply that causal 
perception is a learned ability that requires input from experiences of acting upon objects 
in a causal manner. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The present study provided no evidence that experiencing causality via contingent 
haptic, proprioceptive, and visual information facilitates the emergence of causal 
perception. At this point, however, the possibility that passive experience could still have 
a facilitative effect cannot be ruled out. An important limitation of the present study is 
that a condition in which infants were provided passive training in the absence of parent 
interaction was not included. Because an interference effect was found when infants 
received active training with parent interaction, it is possible that parent interference 
could potentially explain the results obtained in the PI condition as well. In order to 
eliminate the possibility that infants in the PI condition failed to learn about causality 
because of parent interaction, it is necessary to provide infants with passive training 
without parent interaction.  Thus, the possibility remains open that passive training could 
facilitate causal perception in 4½-month-olds. If this passive/no interaction condition 
were tested, two possibilities arise. The first is that passive training without parent 





need to learn about force rather than agency in order to generalize their experience to aid 
in understanding causal events. However, if it is the case that infants who receive passive 
training without parent interaction do not demonstrate causal perception, then active 
experience would be implicated as the source of infants’ early ability to perceive 
causality, although only without parent interactions. In this case, the results would imply 
that information about agency is important in the development of causal perception in 
infancy.  
The results obtained in the current study suggest that self-produced causal action 
experience is an important factor that supports young infants’ learning about the causal 
interactions between objects, but the current study falls short of providing evidence that 
self-produced action alone is the mechanism by which causal perception arises. In the 
current study, the self-produced action that leads to causal perception was confounded by 
simultaneous haptic and visual sensory experiences. What is not known, from the current 
study, is how important the haptic and visual experiences are in the effects of self-
produced action. There is some evidence to suggest that young infants may be able to 
learn novel cause-and-effect relationships from self-produced actions that do not involve 
haptic sensory input. In a recent study by Wang et al. (2012), 6- and 8-month-olds’ were 
given the opportunity to cause an event to occur using their eye movements. Using an 
eye-tracker, researchers presented infants with a red circle on a white background on a 
computer screen. When infants looked at the red circle for 600 milliseconds an event was 
triggered in which a “bing” sound was played and a picture of an animal appeared. After 
the picture was displayed for 1.5 seconds the sequence started over and infants were 





that although the button was visible for the duration of the task, infants spent more time 
fixating on the animal pictures, and only looked at the button to produce the image again. 
Additionally, infants’ reaction times decreased significantly over their first three 
“presses” indicating that they rapidly learned the association between their action and the 
function of the button.  Of course, infants in Wang et al.’s (2012) first experiment may 
have “pressed” the button simply because it was the only object on the screen after the 
picture disappeared. To control for this possibility, the authors tested a new group of 
infants of the same ages, and a group of adults, on a new task in which two buttons were 
presented on the screen. This time, only one of the buttons triggered the appearance of 
the animal image, and after it appeared, the image began to slowly fade from the screen. 
Only 9 out of 25 adults reported that they understood the function of the buttons 
following the experiment. Infants, and the adults who reported understanding the purpose 
of the buttons, showed a significant visual preference for the useful button throughout the 
task. Adults who did not discern the function of the buttons looked equally at both of 
them. These results suggest that infants may be more open or sensitive to novel forms of 
agency than adults and also support the idea that action-contingent tasks (e.g., active 
sticky mittens training) may allow infants to rapidly discover that they are able to 
perform a novel causal action, which may in turn serve to provide cues to the infant about 
its own agency and facilitate causal perception. Future studies should seek to test whether 
active self-produced object manipulation experience in the absence of physical 
experience can elicit causal perception. This could be accomplished by creating eye-
tracking training tasks that allow infants to move objects on a screen using their eye 





Future research should also consider how infants’ experience with objects affects 
their predictions about how those objects will behave. For instance, it would be 
interesting to examine whether experience manipulating differently sized and weighted 
objects might impose top-down effects on infants performance in a visual habituation 
task. For example, if young infants who are given experience manipulating weighted 
objects respond differently to launching events involving those objects compared to 
infants who did not manipulate them, this would add further support to the idea that 
haptic and proprioceptive input from self-produced acts generates predictions about 
causality in launching events. 
As highlighted above, an important implication of the current study is that if 
young infants are provided with an earlier opportunity to exercise volitional control over 
the physical world, they may reach cognitive milestones, such as understanding physical 
causality, at an earlier age. From this idea, it follows that infants who are unable to 
interact with the environment in meaningful ways will not receive the kind of experience 
that is necessary for the development of robust causal representations, or at least that their 
representations should develop much more slowly than in typically developing infants. 
This prediction could be investigated by studying the emergence of causal perception in 
populations of infants with delayed or impaired motor development, such as infants and 
toddlers with Cerebral Palsy. 
Conclusions 
Based on the present findings and those of Rakison and Krogh (2012), the ability 
to perceive cause-and–effect relationships in the external world can be facilitated by the 
ability to act upon objects in a causal manner. The results of Rakison and Krogh’s (2012) 





suggests that causal perception is not necessarily separate from causal inference. 
Information learned through self-produced action experiences serves as direct input that 
facilitates causal perception in infancy, which implies that that causal perception is not 
merely a perceptual phenomenon. The present findings also suggest that infant learning 
may not always benefit from parental interactions. Evidence from this study suggests that 
when infants are learning a new skill, it may be beneficial to allow infants to explore 
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Instructions provided to parents during the SM training phase in the AP and CTRL 
conditions of the present study. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
For this part of our study we are going to have you and your child complete a play session. On the 
table you’ll notice a pair of red mittens that have Velcro sewn on the palms. These toys 
will allow your child to pick up these yellow, Velcro-covered balls. (Demonstrate by 
picking up a mitten and tapping a ball with the Velcro side) 
 
Before we get started, I’ll have you put the Velcro mittens on your baby’s hands so that the 
Velcro is on the palm side of his/her hand. Make sure they are comfortable but won’t slip 
off. 
 
Seat your baby on your lap in front of the table so that your baby can comfortably reach the toys 
on the table. His/her arms should be above the table. If you think your child is seated too 
low to reach comfortably we can place a pillow under him/her so that he/she is seated 
higher. 
 
<EXPERIMENTER: START THE VIDEO RECORDING AND TIMER> 
 
Now, I’ll have you draw attention to the toys in front of your baby by saying: “We are going to 
play with these now!” 
 
Please demonstrate ONCE how the toy sticks to the mittens by guiding your child’s hand to the 
toy and making it stick. Now, please SHAKE YOUR CHILD’S HAND TO DRAW 
ATTENTION TO THE ATTACHED TOY. After about 10 seconds, remove the toy from 
the mitten and place it on the table. 
 
From this point forward, we will allow your baby to reach for the toys independently. If you 
would like, feel free to draw attention to the toys by pointing to them or by briefly 
shaking or banging them. Please encourage your child to reach for the toys by asking 
“CAN YOU GET IT?” 
 
If the toy sticks to the mittens, we ask that you PRAISE YOUR CHILD’S SUCCESS and then 
remove the toy from the mittens after about 10 seconds.  
 
BE SURE TO REMOVE THE TOY FROM YOUR CHILD’S MITTEN BEFORE THEY 
BRING IT UP TO THEIR FACE BECAUSE THE VELCRO MAY BE 
UNCOMFORTABLE. After you place the toys back on the table please encourage your 
child to try again (for example, say: “CAN YOU GET IT AGAIN?”).  
 








Instructions provided to parents during the SM training phase in the PI condition. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
For this part of our study we are going to have you and your child complete a play session. On the 
table you’ll notice a pair of red mittens that have Velcro sewn on the palms. These toys 
will allow your child to pick up these yellow, Velcro-covered balls. (Demonstrate by 
picking up a mitten and tapping a ball with the Velcro side) 
 
Before we get started, I’ll have you put the Velcro mittens on your baby’s hands so that the 
Velcro is on the palm side of his/her hand. Make sure they are comfortable but won’t slip 
off. 
 
Seat your baby on your lap in front of the table so that your baby can comfortably reach the toys 
on the table. His/her arms should be above the table. If you think your child is seated too 
low to reach comfortably we can place a pillow under him/her so that he/she is seated 
higher. 
 
<EXPERIMENTER: START THE VIDEO RECORDING AND TIMER> 
 
THE ONLY RULE FOR THIS TASK IS THAT YOU WILL BE HELPING YOUR BABY 
BY CONTROLLING YOUR BABY’S ARMS AND GUIDING HIS/HER HANDS 
TO THE OBJECTS FOR HIM/HER.  
 
Now, I’ll have you draw attention to the toys in front of your baby by saying: “We are going to 
play with these now!” 
 
Please demonstrate ONCE how the toy sticks to the mittens by guiding your child’s hand to the 
toy and making it stick. Now, please SHAKE YOUR CHILD’S HAND TO DRAW 
ATTENTION TO THE ATTACHED TOY. After about 10 seconds, remove the toy from 
the mitten and place it on the table. 
 
From this point forward, YOU WILL CONTINUE TO DIRECT YOUR CHILD’S ARMS AND 
HANDS TO THE TOYS IN THE SAME MANNER. If you would like, feel free to draw 
attention to the toys by briefly shaking or banging them. Be sure to encourage your child 
as you help them reach for the toys by asking “CAN YOU GET IT?” 
 
If the toy sticks to the mittens, we ask that you PRAISE YOUR CHILD’S SUCCESS and then 
remove the toy from the mittens after about 10 seconds.  
 
PLEASE DO NOT TOUCH THE ATTACHED TOYS TO YOUR CHILD’S FACE, BECAUSE 
THE VELCRO MAY BE UNCOMFORTABLE. After you place the toys back on the 
table encourage your child to try again (for example, say: “CAN YOU GET IT 
AGAIN?”).  
 







Instructions provided to parents during the SM training phase in the AN condition. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
For this part of our study we are going to have you and your child complete a play session. On the 
table you’ll notice a pair of red mittens that have Velcro sewn on the palms. These toys 
will allow your child to pick up these yellow, Velcro-covered balls. (Demonstrate by 
picking up a mitten and tapping a ball with the Velcro side) 
 
Before we get started, I’ll have you put the Velcro mittens on your baby’s hands so that the 
Velcro is on the palm side of his/her hand. Make sure they are comfortable but won’t slip 
off. 
 
Seat your baby on your lap in front of the table so that your baby can comfortably reach the toys 
on the table. His/her arms should be above the table. If you think your child is seated too 
low to reach comfortably we can place a pillow under him/her so that he/she is seated 
higher. 
 
<EXPERIMENTER: START THE VIDEO RECORDING AND TIMER> 
 
THE ONLY RULE FOR THIS TASK IS THAT YOU ARE NOT ALLOWED TO TALK 
DURING THE PLAY SESSION. 
 
Please demonstrate ONCE how the toy sticks to the mittens by guiding your child’s hand to the 
toy and making it stick. Now, please SHAKE YOUR CHILD’S HAND TO DRAW 
ATTENTION TO THE ATTACHED TOY. After about 10 seconds, remove the toy from 
the mitten and place it on the table. 
 
From this point forward, we will allow your baby to reach for the toys independently. If you 
would like, feel free to draw attention to the toys by briefly shaking or banging them. 
But, remember, PLEASE DON’T TALK. 
 
BE SURE TO REMOVE THE TOY FROM YOUR CHILD’S MITTEN BEFORE THEY 
BRING IT UP TO THEIR FACE BECAUSE THE VELCRO MAY BE 
UNCOMFORTABLE.  
 








Caregiver perception rating scale that parents completed following SM training.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Please compare your child’s behavior during the Velcro-mitten play session we have just 
completed to your observations of your child in similar situations. Circle the response 
that comes closest to your observations. 
 
 
                1     2       3 
 
 
1. Alertness Less than usual/sleepy      typical very alert 
     greater than usual 
 
 
2. Emotional more negative      typical more positive 
    reaction than usual   than usual 
 
 
3. Level of interest less than usual      typical greater interest/ 
    and attention     greater attention 
 
 
4. Comfort level more cautious/      typical more comfortable/ 
 wary than usual   relaxed than usual 
 
 
5. Level of activity less active than usual      typical more active than  
      usual 
 
 
6. Enjoyment less enjoyment      typical more enjoyment  













Reasons that Infants were Excluded from the Final Dataset by Condition 
Reason for Exclusion Total (n = 44) CTRL (n = 10) PI (n = 14) AN (n = 8) AI (n = 12) 
Parent failed to comply with SM 
task instructions 
3 0 2 0 1 
Infant fussiness 6 1 2 1 2 
Parent interfered during habituation 1 0 0 0 1 
Infant inattention or sleepiness 10 0 4 4 2 
Failure to meet habituation criterion 8 5 2 0 1 
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